Bruno Coppieters is Associate Professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and has facilitated a number of academic dialogue initiatives with individuals from Georgia and Abkhazia.
Before the war of
1992–93 Abkhazia had a population of half a million. Squeezed between the Black
Sea and the Caucasus mountains it had been known as the Soviet Riviera in the
1970s and 1980s, when millions of tourists came every year to enjoy its beaches
and subtropical climate. Its agriculture supplied Soviet markets with tobacco,
precious woods and citrus fruits. At the end of the 1980s, however, this
peaceful area became a violent zone of conflict in the Soviet Union and Abkhazia
became a symbol for the failure of Soviet policies to accommodate competing
ethnic claims. What went wrong with Soviet policy and why did Abkhazia in
particular become the scene of a bloody war that cost several thousand lives?
Soviet
nationalities policy granted political status to the major nationalities which
composed the Soviet state and ranked them in a hierarchical federal system.
Their place in the hierarchy depended on a number of factors such as population
size, geographical location and political leverage with the Communist Party
elite. In the Soviet ethnofederal construction, the union republics had the
highest status, followed by the autonomous republics with the autonomous regions
in the third rank. The political status of all units could change over time
according to circumstances and the political considerations of the Moscow party
leadership. Each national group which had received the right to constitute one
of these units was recognized as its ‘titular nation’. The Abkhaz were thus the
titular nation of the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia and the
Georgians the titular nation of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia. In the
Soviet view, this type of system could not be called ethnocratic, despite the
political privileges given to the titular nations, because the Communist Party
and its internationalist ideology claimed to preserve the rights of all
minorities and all citizens, independent of their nationality. The centralist
exercise of political power was seen as the most effective means of avoiding
discrimination in a federal state. With the disintegration of the Communist
Party at the end of the 1980s, this institutional guarantee for minorities
disappeared.
With the democratization of the Soviet system and the collapse of centralized power, the legitimacy of the federal order and hierarchical relations between union republics, autonomous republics and autonomous regions became one of the main subjects of dispute. Some national movements in autonomous republics and regions refused to be considered part of a union republic. In most of the Russian Federation, these conflicts were settled by mutual agreement, but in the North and South Caucasus the crisis of legitimacy led to political tension and in some cases to violent clashes between the capitals of the union republics and their subordinate units. In Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the legitimacy of the Soviet federal hierarchy was challenged by all sides. The political leadership of the autonomous region of South Ossetia strove to upgrade the status of the region through reunification with the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic (which lay within the Russian Federation). In a counter move Tbilisi abolished South Ossetia’s autonomous status in 1990. Georgian nationalists considered such autonomy as a Soviet instrument to divide and rule its dependencies in the South Caucasus. Furthermore the Georgians did not regard the Ossetians as indigenous.
In the Georgian
view, the Abkhaz were different. They had the right to preserve their political
status as an indigenous people, provided that the rights of the Georgian
population in Abkhazia were significantly extended. Georgians made up some
forty-five per cent of the population and were challenging the political
privileges of the Abkhaz titular nation, which comprised only eighteen per cent.
The political leadership in Tbilisi did not see any reason why the Soviet
hierarchical system should not be preserved and even enforced after the
achievement of independence. The politically privileged position of the Abkhaz
minority was unacceptable to them. The leaders of the Abkhaz national movement
refused to acknowledge the authority of the Georgian political leadership in
Tbilisi and before the dissolution of the USSR had already striven to upgrade
Abkhazia’s status from autonomous republic to union republic. After its
dissolution they demanded equal status with Georgia in a loose federative
framework. This form of withdrawal from the authority of the Georgian state
would, in the view of the Georgians and of Abkhaz radicals, have paved the way
for full secession and the establishment of an independent Abkhaz state.The
conflict over political status reached its climax with the war of 1992–93 when
Georgian troops, consisting mainly of paramilitaries, intervened in the
political conflict between the two main nationalities of Abkhazia. They were
driven out by Abkhaz troops supported by nationalist movements from the North
Caucasus and by the Russian military. As a consequence of this victory the
Abkhaz authorities attempted to consolidate their position by changing the
demographic situation. The majority of the Georgian inhabitants of Abkhazia fled
to Georgia and these internally displaced persons (IDPs) were not allowed to
return. To date no solution has been found to the political and humanitarian
dilemmas at the heart of the conflict. Russian troops were deployed on the
ceasefire line between the parties in 1993, formally becoming the CISPKF in
1994. The United Nations has sent military observers to the conflict zone and is
mediating between the two sides, with Russia acting as facilitator, but
negotiations on political status have not led to significant results. Since 1997
the negotiation process has concentrated on economic and humanitarian
co-operation, also without substantial progress. Indeed, in May 1998 violence
erupted in the Gali region of southern Abkhazia again, causing a major setback
in relations. Over the previous three years the spontaneous return of IDPs to
the Gali region had, in the Abkhaz view, provided cover for Georgian guerrillas.
Clashes between them and Abkhaz militia led to a resumption of hostilities,
resulting in a new wave of IDPs fleeing the region. In order to avoid the
accusation of ethnic cleansing, the Abkhaz authorities began to organize the
return of Georgian IDPs to the Gali region from March 1999 but refused any
direct Georgian involvement in securing their safety. The Georgian government
considers bilateral agreements giving security guarantees for the returning IDPs
to be vital. The Abkhaz government, however, sees the lifting of the CIS-
imposed blockade as a necessary first step in a process of normalization.
There is no commonly accepted analysis for the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict among either those who are politically involved or among outside observers. Different explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but each explanation has specific political implications which determine the type of resolution that is most appropriate.
Understanding nationhood
The conflict may be seen primarily as a consequence of conflicting views and of existing fears with regard to the preservation of language, culture and national identity. The Georgians feared the Russification of Abkhazia by cultural means and the loss of the ‘historical’ Georgian character of this region. They criticized the close links between the Abkhaz leadership and Moscow. The Abkhaz feared that the Georgianization of Abkhazia, which in their view was far advanced under the Soviet regime, would be completed through the integration of Abkhazia into a Georgian framework. They were concerned that a rise in the number of Georgians through further ‘colonization’ would lead to the exclusion of the Abkhaz from political power in their own homeland and limit their rights. In the view of both parties, political sovereignty – which meant in practice full control of the state apparatus of Abkhazia – was the sole instrument to counter that fear of extinction. Concepts such as shared sovereignty had no practical meaning for politicians whose experience was restricted to Soviet practice. The Leninist regime had never recognized any form of division of powers as legitimate. A federal division of political power into various levels of authority with separate jurisdictions was unknown in the Soviet Union.
Those citing fear of cultural extinction as the cause of the conflict emphasize the ethnic and cultural understanding of nationhood by political elites. The Georgian and Abkhaz concept of the nation is based on language, religion and common descent and emerged as a consequence of the modernization of the region at the end of the nineteenth century. The debates between historians and linguists from both communities on national descent were linked to territorial claims on Abkhazia. Some Georgian historians claimed that the Abkhaz had settled in the area only a few centuries ago. From the Abkhaz perspective, Georgians had settled in Abkhazia as a result of Tsarist and Soviet colonization policies. According to this type of explanation, the national projects which both communities developed included claims of an exclusive right to sovereignty over Abkhaz territory. The root of the conflict is seen in the ethnic nature of Georgian and Abkhaz nationalism, which was bound to have explosive results as the communist regime weakened. Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika did indeed lead to a radical redistribution of power between the national elites. The leaderships of Georgia and Abkhazia proved incapable of reaching agreement in renegotiating their political relations after the disappearance of an overarching Soviet framework, which left the use of force an increasingly likely possibility.
This
focus on ethnic nationalism calls for a solution based on the creation of a more
civic type of national consciousness with individuals voluntarily associating
themselves in a state, and with common values and democratic institutions as
binding forces. The democratization of political institutions and the creation
of a civil society are seen as part of an overall strategy to create new links
between individuals which are not based on ethnicity. Scholars of nationalism
would, however, stress that idioms of nationhood found in Georgia and Abkhazia
have characteristics which tend to persist throughout the whole process of
nation building and which change only very slowly. But it is also true that a
peace settlement and the creation of a new institutional framework in Georgia
and Abkhazia may have a positive influence on the political practices and
attitudes of the elites. Their search for legitimacy will require a more
pluralistic, assimilationist and inclusive understanding of nationhood as
opposed to the previous exclusive idiom. The Georgian authorities have already
had to respond to the universalistic legal obligations imposed by organizations
such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Council
of Europe. Although not recognized by these organizations, the Abkhaz government
is unwilling to be seen as a pariah in terms of the observance of human rights
standards. It also has to find legitimacy among the Armenian, Russian and Greek
communities in Abkhazia and integrate the returning Georgian IDPs. A peace
settlement may further encourage a gradual transformation of the state and
nation-building process on a civic rather than an ethnic basis.
Geopolitical factors
The lack of legitimacy of the new states that
emerged on the post-Soviet scene and the eruption of violent conflicts between
national communities may be understood as a consequence of geopolitical factors
which are not ideological. According to such a perspective, the conflict between
Georgians and Abkhaz was generated first by the Soviet and then by the Russian
authorities in a desperate attempt to retain their hegemony on their southern
borders. The key to the solution of the conflict is therefore to be found in
Moscow. This explanation is based on the presupposition of a continuity in
imperial domination of the periphery by the centre from Tsarist through to the
Soviet and Russian political eras. The conflict between the Georgians and Abkhaz,
which is so detrimental to the interests of both communities, should be seen as
a consequence of a deliberate divide and rule policy designed in Moscow. In
1992–93 pro-Abkhaz forces in Russia would have supported the Abkhaz
secessionists in order to take revenge on the Georgian leader Eduard
Shevardnadze who, as Soviet foreign minister, had, in their view, sold out all
Soviet interests to the West. This Russian imperial policy secured Georgia’s
entry into the CIS after its military defeat in September 1993 as well as the
stationing of Russian bases on Georgian territory. Russia might, according to
this type of explanation, have used the conflict to influence the negotiations
between Western oil companies and governments on the routing of oil pipelines
from the Caspian region to the world market. One of these routes – the so-called
western route – passes through Georgia to the Black Sea port of Poti. A
destabilization of the western route would have made the northern route, which
passes through the North Caucasus in the Russian Federation to Novorossiisk,
more attractive. Moreover, an agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia would
strengthen the position of nationalistic anti-Russian forces in the Caucasus
region and facilitate Georgia’s integration into Western political and military
structures, which is not in Moscow’s interest. NATO’s increasing presence in the
region through programmes such as Partnership for Peace should not be
underestimated in an assessment of Russia’s policies. Russia’s divide and rule
policy would on the other hand gain nothing by allowing Abkhazia to be
independent, as this would strengthen instability and separatism in the North
Caucasus.
Georgian public
discussion focuses almost exclusively on the Russian factor. For Tbilisi, this
is useful in mobilizing support among Western powers, which are receptive to the
argument that Russia retains imperial ambitions that ought to be counterbalanced
with more support to the countries along Russia’s southern belt. This approach
implies a harmony of interests between the Georgian and Abkhaz communities that
would have continued but for outside manipulation, a view that is obviously
problematic. The contrast between the harmonious relations that are supposed to
have existed in the past and the violent character of the war focuses
exclusively on external factors of conflict. To say that the key to the solution
of the conflict is to be found in Moscow distracts attention from a serious
discussion of the difficulties in overcoming the antagonistic relations that
both communities have been building over a long period. It also impedes a
fruitful discussion of the federalization of Georgia. Many believe that granting
any form of self-government to Georgia’s numerous minorities would give Russia
an instrument with which to exploit ethnic divisions in the country.The critique
of an exclusively external approach to the conflict does not invalidate the
geopolitical explanation. The poor record of Russian mediation in the conflict
is partly due to the fact that Russia has particular interests to defend in the
region. Russia’s past as a colonial power makes it poorly suited for the role of
peacemaker. Both parties to the conflict depend on Moscow, but at the same time
have a deep distrust towards its policies and intentions. The Georgians blame
Moscow for the failure of the negotiations, while the Abkhaz blame Moscow for
the economic blockade.
Any perspective of
a political settlement to the conflict based on federal principles has to take
into account the geopolitical context. No federal system may be considered
stable if outside powers constantly intervene. Some authors therefore plead for
a policy of neutrality for Georgia and Abkhazia. Only by refusing to be part of
a ‘great game’ between external powers would both communities be able to reach a
stable federal arrangement in which they would not constantly seek external
support.
Another option would be the constitution of a larger framework of political integration for the Caucasian countries which would include Russia and which would receive support from the West including the USA. Both options presuppose that a policy based on the balance of power between stronger states would destabilize any political arrangement between less powerful states such as Georgia and Abkhazia.
Legitimate rule
Just and legitimate rule are crucial concepts for explaining a political conflict and for its resolution. In the case of the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict, historians have extensively researched the historic grievances of both communities. The French historian Papin described in 1824 the ‘state of perpetual hostility’ in which the Abkhaz were living ‘with their neighbours the Russians from Doudjouk-Kal and the Mingrelians’. Events such as the Caucasian war, which ended in 1864, the deportation of a large part of the Abkhaz population by the Tsarist regime in the wake of the failed uprisings of 1866 and 1877, the Georgian colonization of the country and the establishment of Soviet rule, are grievances still held by Abkhaz today. The subjugation of the Abkhaz by stronger powers such as Russia, Georgia or the Soviet regime failed to secure their loyalty even though it was usually enshrined in some kind of treaty. The demise of the Soviet Empire could be seen, according to this type of explanation, as having created a window of opportunity for the Abkhaz leadership.
At the end of 1991 Georgia was plunged into a
civil war in which President Zviad Gamsakhurdia was ousted by his former
supporters and later replaced by Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Soviet Minister
of Foreign Affairs. In Abkhazia the majority of the Georgian population had
supported Gamsakhurdia, and was, moreover, involved in a severe conflict with
the Abkhaz representatives. None of these competing authorities was strong
enough to impose its will on the territories of Georgia or Abkhazia. No
arrangement could be found which could be considered legitimate. An attempt to
overcome the destabilizing consequences of rule by the largest ethnic group was
sought in a system of ethnic quotas for the elections to the Abkhaz Supreme
Soviet, implemented in 1991 under Gamsakhurdia but considered ‘racist’ and a
form of ‘apartheid’ by his successor Shevardnadze. As a consequence, the power
relations between the various political actors in Georgia and Abkhazia had to be
measured by other than democratic and peaceful means. The war should be seen as
a result of the failure of the previous agreements and institutions to gain
acceptance.
Explaining the roots of the conflict in terms of legitimacy calls for the creation of a federative system – a ‘common state’ as it has been called in the negotiations – which would be based on the principles of equality, liberty and self-government for all major national communities. The legitimacy of such a federative arrangement would depend on the ability of both parties to make compromises that are acceptable to public opinion. Institutionalization on its own, however legally sophisticated, could not survive without popular support.
The negotiations on
political status may be combined with the other two conflict resolution
strategies – the development of a more civic approach to state and nation
building and a neutral foreign policy. The creation of a pluralistic and
democratic ethnofederal system, accommodating the claims of all national
communities, could prevent the destructive consequences of ethnic nationalism.
The parties to the Georgian–Abkhaz conflict have presently failed, however, to
change the logic of confrontation. It may be years before all those who consider
Abkhazia to be their homeland are able to accept the simple truth that dialogue
and accommodation may be more rewarding than the present stalemate.