S. Neil MacFarlane is Lester B. Pearson
Professor of International Relations at the University of Oxford, Professorial
Fellow at St Anne’s College and Director of Oxford’s Centre for International
Studies. In 1997, with colleagues at Brown University, he completed a monograph
on humanitarian action in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that followed a
companion study on Georgia’s civil conflicts published in 1996.
The UN has been involved in the conflict in
Abkhazia since Georgian forces stormed the Abkhaz parliament in Sukhumi in
August 1992, triggering a war that remains unresolved today. In 1993, the UN and
the CSCE agreed that the international lead on the conflict in Abkhazia should
be taken by the UN, while that in South Ossetia should go to the CSCE.
In the same year the UN, faced with urgent
requests from the government of Georgia to deploy a peacekeeping force to
Abkhazia, decided to establish an observer mission for Georgia (UNOMIG) to
monitor implementation of the July ceasefire agreement between the two sides
which had been mediated and guaranteed by the Russian Federation. The decision
to send an observer force rather than a fully fledged peacekeeping force
reflected the desire of the Russian Federation to take the lead in the
management of conflict in the ‘former Soviet space’, and the unwillingness of
the other permanent members of the Security Council to challenge Russian
prerogatives. There was also a general concern that the peacekeeping apparatus
of the UN was overloaded, and disagreement among the parties as to what the
mandate of a more substantial force would be. The UN Secretary-General also
designated Swiss diplomat Eduard Brunner as Special Envoy for the conflict. He
served until 1997 when Liviu Bota, a Romanian diplomat, was appointed Special
Representative (SRSG) for the Abkhaz conflict. Both were responsible for the
mediation of a process of negotiation leading to a political settlement of the
conflict. Bota has had a more or less permanent presence in the conflict zone,
whereas Brunner was only delegated to visit intermittently. Russia’s special
status in this process was recognized in its designation as ‘facilitator’ of the
talks. In the early years of negotiation matters were not helped by the passive
attitude taken by the Special Envoy to mediation of the conflict. The UN’s
failure to take a more engaged approach was one factor among several
contributing to the obvious lack of movement towards a political settlement in
1994–96. The fact that the more proactive approach adopted by Liviu Bota has
also not produced a settlement would suggest, however, that the extent of UN
activism is not the determining factor in conflict resolution. While the first
personnel of UNOMIG were being deployed, the ceasefire collapsed and hostilities
resumed. The UN Security Council condemned the renewal of conflict and
associated displacement of population and demanded that the parties cease
fighting. They also decided to extend the mandate of UNOMIG pending
clarification of the situation.
Humanitarian intervention
The rapid exodus of displaced persons from Abkhazia, many of whom fled via
mountain passes into Svanetia in winter conditions and with no shelter, created
a humanitarian emergency, occasioning a second UN response, this time by
specialized agencies including UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF. These agencies and their
partner NGOs moved quickly to stabilize the situation of the internally
displaced. They also assisted in addressing the humanitarian consequences of
Georgia’s economic collapse, the product of the country’s multiple wars and the
collapse of the Soviet command economy. Over the period 1994–97, UNDHA mounted
three consolidated interagency appeals for the Caucasus, with approximately $87
million going to UN agency and NGO activities in Georgia. In the first years of
UN involvement in the humanitarian response to the emergency in Georgia, the
statist nature of the organization revealed itself in the exclusion of areas
under Abkhaz control from needs assessment and delivery of services by the UN.
This omission may have impeded the negotiation of a settlement by enhancing the
Abkhaz sense of isolation and creating an appearance of UN bias in favour of
Georgia’s central government. In consequence, the ground was left to NGOs such
as the ICRC and Médecins Sans Frontières.
UNHCR took a prominent role in early efforts to
secure a return of the displaced to Abkhazia. This role was most obvious in the
negotiations in 1994 which led to agreement on the deployment of a CIS
peacekeeping force to be interposed in a security zone between the two parties
and the associated agreement on return of displaced persons. The CISPKF was
deployed in mid-1994 and secured the line of contact, but the agreement on
return failed miserably with only 311 families out of the estimated 240,000
affected people actually being approved for return. This was largely due to the
provision within the agreement that the Abkhaz side had the right for security
reasons to vet those returning. The 1994 agreement on return also failed to
address the security needs of Georgians returning to Abkhaz-controlled areas. In
this respect it was probably a good thing that so few did return. More broadly,
UNHCR’s involvement in the process of negotiation raised important questions
about whether its status as an advocate for the welfare and rights of IDPs and
refugees had been jeopardized by its diplomatic role.
The failure of the 1994 agreement on return did
much to poison the atmosphere in talks on a resolution of the conflict. From the
Georgian perspective, the Abkhaz behaviour reflected bad faith in the effort to
resolve a humanitarian issue that was creating a substantial burden on
government resources and contributing to the propensity for instability in
Samegrelo. To judge from subsequent events, however, there is some validity in
Abkhaz concerns about the security consequences of indiscriminate return.
Working with peacekeepers
The deployment of CISPKF resulted in a change in the circumstances of UNOMIG.
The observer mission was expanded from 40 to 136 (in early 1999 it stood at 102
from 20 countries), given the task of observing the activities of CISPKF in the
security zone and monitoring compliance with provisions for a weapons exclusion
zone on both sides of the security zone. The mandates of both CISPKF and UNOMIG
included provision for the promotion of conditions conducive to the return of
the displaced population. The mandates of both forces have been renewed at
six-month intervals since the beginning of their co-operative deployment in
1994. The six-month renewal process has the advantage of bringing the Georgian
issue back to the Security Council on a regular basis. On the other hand,
reopening the issue invites regular posturing and mutual recrimination by the
parties. This does little to further the peace process. Moreover, the CIS has
repeatedly failed to renew the mandate of its force in a timely manner, raising
doubts about the legal status of the force during periods when the mandate has
lapsed and increasing uncertainty and tension on the ground.
It is worth stressing that the interaction between
the UN and the CIS in peacekeeping in Georgia is an important example of the
sharing of security tasks between the UN and regional organizations. The
collaboration has not been easy, although it has improved with time. Russian
soldiers deployed to the security zone in the early days were ill suited to
peacekeeping, were perceived by both Georgians and UN personnel as lacking
impartiality and frequently engaged in harassment of the local population. UN
and Russian norms regarding rules of engagement differed markedly. UN personnel
were troubled by the corruption evident in some Russian units. Initially, UN
observers had difficulty in securing full access to, and freedom of movement in,
their areas of operation.
These problems have not disappeared. Accusations
by Georgians that CISPKF has been complicit in Abkhaz sweeps through the Gali
region, or by Abkhaz that it has failed to prevent the penetration of guerrillas,
continue. However, those familiar with the operation generally accept that the
Russian performance has improved, in part because the presence of UN personnel
and the reasonably close contact between the forces has served as a transmission
belt for international peacekeeping norms. On the other hand, the neutrality of
the force continues to be questioned by many Georgians, despite the presence of
UNOMIG.
Addressing instability
The organized return of the displaced failed in 1994, resulting in a gradual
process of spontaneous return in 1995–97. This occasioned substantial and
repeated violations of the human rights of the civilian population in the Gali
region Initially, neither CISPKF nor UNOMIG made any serious effort to prevent
these incidents, arguing that the protection of human rights lay outside their
mandates. This damaged the credibility and impartiality of both.
After serious human rights violations in 1995,
CISPKF and UNOMIG took a more proactive approach to the protection of the
returning population, despite the fact that their mandates did not entirely
provide for this. Other attempts to address this issue have included the
establishment of a joint UN/OSCE Human Rights Office in Sukhumi in 1996 (although
it only really became active in 1999) and increased discussion since Spring 1999
about the establishment of a joint investigation unit to explore violations of
agreements as well as some cases of criminal activity in the security zone. This
has yet to be agreed upon.
The number of returnees to Gali grew gradually
through 1996 and into 1997. These returnees were accompanied by guerrilla groups
who attacked both CISPKF and Abkhaz personnel. By the spring of 1998 the
security situation deteriorated to the point that CISPKF ceased patrolling in
the security zone while UNOMIG closed its team bases and concentrated its
personnel in Gali and Zugdidi. The Abkhaz de facto authorities then renewed
their attacks of the returning Georgian population in May 1998, leading to
further mass displacement. This renewed violence might have been prevented or
moderated had CISPKF and the UN taken a more proactive stance at this time. The
impunity with which the operation was conducted reflects the erosion of the
credibility of both the CISKPF and UNOMIG.
Instability also spilled over into
Georgian-controlled areas. The UNOMIG sector headquarters in Zugdidi were
invaded in February 1998 and several members of the force were kidnapped. This
was linked to efforts earlier in the year to assassinate President Shevardnadze
and coincided with a number of serious terrorist attacks on government targets
in Zugdidi, signalling a general decline in the situation. In July, a UN
employee who had previously worked in Sukhumi was murdered in Tbilisi. The
problem was not limited to Georgian-held territory. In the summer NGO personnel
involved in the demining programme were attacked in Abkhazia. In the autumn,
UNOMIG headquarters in Sukhumi was targeted in a series of grenade incidents and
three members of the force were wounded during an assault on a UNOMIG vehicle.
This series of events led one important contributor to UNOMIG (the United States)
to withdraw its personnel and to ban travel by its citizens to Abkhazia.
The diplomatic front
Ironically, perhaps, the same period was marked by a quickening of the
long-stalled peace process, the result of a more proactive role taken by the
newly arrived SRSG, Liviu Bota, who initiated the Geneva Process, an intensive
series of meetings, among the parties and other interested states and
organizations. UN activities were paralleled by a more active Russian diplomacy
towards the conflict. The formation of the Group of Friends of the
Secretary-General on Georgia and their formal association with the peace talks
diluted the dominance of Russia in the process of mediation, as did the
participation of OSCE representatives. In August 1997 President Shevardnadze met
with the Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba in Tbilisi for bilateral talks under
the patronage of Russian Foreign Minister Evgenii Primakov. By the end of 1997
the Geneva Process had produced agreement to a programme of action on the peace
process and the establishment of working groups to address three clusters of
issues: non-resumption of hostilities, the return of refugees and IDPs, and
economic and social issues. At this time, it was also agreed to establish a
Co-ordinating Council for the peace process that would institutionalize the role
of the group of friends. Bilateral contacts extended into 1998 with UN
facilitation and UNOMIG logistical support, and despite the events in Gali in
May. Subsequently, the SRSG organized two further meetings between the parties
(in Athens and Istanbul) to push the process forward.
By the autumn of 1998 the two sides had prepared a
draft agreement on repatriation of refugees after reiterating their commitment
to a non-resumption of hostilities, but Shevardnadze and Ardzinba failed to meet
and sign it. The issue of partial return remains unresolved with the two sides
still quarrelling over such issues as whether women and children should be
allowed to return first, with men of military age being subject to Abkhaz
screening, and whether returnees would be obliged to take Abkhaz citizenship.
Although UN agencies have assisted returnees since 1995, they have always been
ambivalent about spontaneous return without a political settlement, not least as
a result of well-founded fears for the security of returnees. The events of May
1998 have deepened this scepticism.
The acceleration on the diplomatic side was
accompanied by serious exploration of the possibility of using economic
assistance as a means of facilitating a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.
In this context UNDP, drawing upon its success with similar activities in South
Ossetia, mounted a needs assessment mission to Abkhazia in February 1998. A
number of donors, including the USA and the EU, committed several million
dollars to reconstruction and other assistance programming in anticipation of
agreement between the parties on an approach to the reconstruction of Abkhazia.
Like many others this initiative failed, largely
because the developmental objectives of the two parties remained far apart and
because they could not agree on implementation. The Georgian side perceived such
assistance to be a means of tying Abkhazia in practical terms back into an
integrated Georgian economy. The Abkhaz side perceived reconstruction assistance
as a way of rendering Abkhazia itself more viable.
The effectiveness of the UN
The collapse of UNDP’s effort to use economic assistance to push the peace
process forward is only one manifestation of the broader fact that there has
been little progress towards a political settlement of the Abkhaz conflict. This
dismal conclusion is the result of several factors.
It reflects issues and processes over which the UN
has little control. Ultimately, the conflict is not yet ripe for resolution: the
two sides remain unwilling to accept compromises on the key issue of status.
Although the Abkhaz have retreated from the objective of full independence, the
two sides remain divided on whether status should be confederal or meaningfully
federal, on whether the relationship between Sukhumi and Tbilisi should be
horizontal or vertical. Lack of progress on the matter of status prevents
movement on other issues such as the return of IDPs and refugees and economic
and social questions.
An additional problem is engagement in the
conflict by external powers and notably Russia. The Russian Federation played a
substantial role in the active phases of the conflict, apparently seeing it as a
means of bringing Georgia back into the fold. A complete resolution of the
conflict, particularly if this occurred in a negotiating process controlled not
by Russia but by the UN would result in a further decline in Russian influence
over Georgian politics and policy. There is little doubt that the existence of
parallel UN and Russian tracks in the negotiations has impeded the effort to
reach a compromise. The existence of a parallel channel has made it easier for
the parties to resist concessions. However, given the other obstacles to
successful negotiations it is unlikely that this has been a significant
determining factor.
The failure of the UN in Abkhazia also reflects
problems internal to the organization, most notably generating consensus at the
level of the Security Council. The issue here is that the fundamental interests
of the permanent members differ substantially one from another. The Western
powers seek conflict resolution, the consolidation of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the states of the region, and the integration of their
economies into a global economy dominated by the West. UN involvement is seen as
an instrument in the pursuit of these objectives. Russia, on the other hand, has
for much of the post-Soviet period sought to maintain or to re-establish its
influence over the Caucasus region and the dependence of the smaller states on
Russia. It has claimed special rights and responsibilities in the region on the
basis of its preponderance of power and its historical role there. Russia’s
control over the northern Caucasus is vulnerable to instability in the Caucasus
itself, giving the Russians a more direct security interest in the affairs of
Georgia and Azerbaijan. The completion of the Baku–Supsa oil pipeline and the
consequent end to the Russian monopoly on oil export from the Caspian basin
gives Russia yet another incentive to sustain its influence in Abkhazia. For
Russia, a robust UN role might well be a threat to its regional agenda.
This said, it is not clear that UN effectiveness
would be dramatically enhanced were Russia to change its policy. The other
permanent members of the Security Council have remained unenthusiastic about a
more direct UN peacekeeping role, despite Georgia’s apparent desire to replace
CISPKF with a genuinely multilateral force. This reflects the general crisis in
UN peacekeeping in the post-Somalia, post-Bosnia context. Experiences in these
cases and elsewhere suggest that the UN has neither the resources nor the will
for robust and effective peace operations in civil wars. In the meantime, the
disaster for US forces in the Somali conflict has removed any enthusiasm the
Americans have for substantial participation in potentially dangerous UN
operations. Nor have any viable regional peacekeeping alternatives appeared on
the horizon. Notably, although NATO’s operations in Kosovo have encouraged
speculation about the possibility of similar operations in the Caucasus, there
is very little likelihood that NATO would oblige.
Although the UN has not delivered peace (and it is
not clear whether it could have done so given the attitudes of the two parties
and the limited capacities of the UN itself) it has made a positive contribution
to the management of the conflict and ceasefire. The presence of UNOMIG
personnel in the field enhances transparency and limits the capacity of CISPKF
to pursue a unilateral agenda in the conflict zone. It has probably had some
effect in improving the security of civilians in zones patrolled by the mission,
but has not curtailed the persistent, if low, level of violence and criminality
in the region. UNOMIG has been of great use in facilitating humanitarian
assistance in the Gali region and elsewhere in Abkhazia by providing a modicum
of security of movement in often quite dangerous circumstances. More generally,
the UN and other international agencies were instrumental in preventing what
otherwise might have been a complete meltdown of Georgia and total collapse of
order within its borders.
The presence of the UN in the early days also reduced the sense of isolation and desperation on the Georgian side. Although the lack of involvement by UN humanitarian agencies on the Abkhaz side in the first years of the conflict may have had the opposite effect in Abkhazia, since 1996 the specialized agencies have made a conscious effort to pursue proportionality in its delivery of assistance to both sides.